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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

SAUNDRA McDAVID,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

SUPREME COURT NO. 39254-2011
Case No. CV OC 1001334

vs.
MURAT KIROGLU, an individual;
MEGA GROUP INTERNATIONAL,
LLC, a Florida limited liability company;
IZOPOLI GROUP, LLC, a Florida limited
liability company: FLORIDA FLOORS
AND DECOR, INC., a Florida corporation,
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Defendants/Appellants.
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Respondent's Brief

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District
Of the State of Idaho, in and for the Count of Ada
The Honorable Deborah A. Bail

Kenley E. Grover
LERMA LAW OFFICE, PA
3045 E. Copper Point Dr.
P.O. Box 190719
Boise, ID 83719
(208) 288-0608
Fax: (208) 288-0697

Murat Kiroglu
Mega Group International, LLC
Izopoli Group, LLC
Florida Floors and Decor. Inc.
3895 Pembroke Rd.
Hollywood, FL 33021
(954) 616-0770

Attorney for Respondent

Pro Se
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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

a. Nature of the Case
This matter is limited to whether or not Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure Rule l l(b)(3) was
satisfied prior to default judgment being entered against Appellants/Defendants ("Izopoli") when
it did not appear or have counsel appear on its behalf following the withdrawal of its attorney;
and also, was there excusable neglect in Izopoli's delayed filing of the Motion to Set Aside
Default and Default Judgment.

b. Course of the Proceedings
A Complaint was filed by Plaintiff, Saundra McDavid ("McDavid"), against lzopoli and
other named Defendants on January 25, 2010. R. Vol. I, p. 6-22. Izopoli filed its Answer on
March 18, 2010. R. Vol. I, p. 23-38. Izopoli moved to have the case dismissed and the motion
was heard on July 7, 2010. R. Vol. I. p. 39-84; Tr. Vol. I, p 6-15.
On December 13, 2010, counsel for Izopoli filed a Motion for Leave to Withdraw as
Counsel of Record. R. Vol. I, p. 85-91. A copy of the motion was sent to Izopoli via U.S. mail on
the same date. R. Vol. I, p. 87. The motion was heard and granted on February 2, 2011. Tr., Vol.

I, p. 16-17. The Order granting withdrawal was entered on February 17, 2011 and served via
U.S. mail on Izopoli on March 1, 2011. R. Vol. I, p. 92-95.
McDavid filed a Motion for Entry of Default Judgment on March 30, 2011. R. Vol. I, p.

96-104. The Order for Entry of Default Judgment was signed on April 6, 2011 and filed on April
11, 2011. R. Vol. I, p. 105-07. Izopoli filed its Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment
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on July 28, 201 LR. Vol. 1, p. 108-21. McDavid filed a Memorandum in Opposition with
accompanying affidavits. R. Vol. I, p. 122-33. The motion was heard and denied on August 24,
2011. Tr., Vol. I, p 18-29. The Order denying the motion was signed September 9, 2011. R. Vol.
I, P. 134-35. A Notice of Appeal was filed on October 6, 2011. R. Vol. I, p. 136-42.
c. Statement of the Facts

Izopoli was aware that its attorney was seeking to withdraw in mid-December 2010. R.
Vol. I, 85-91. Counsel for Izopoli was granted leave to withdraw on February 17, 2011 and

served the Order on Izopoli twelve days later. R. Vol. I, p. 92-95.
On April 1, 2011, Izopoli contacted McDavid' s attorney regarding the Order granting
leave to withdraw and the Motion for Default. R. Vol. I, p. 123. Izopoli made it clear that it was
aware that it was required to appear, personally or by counsel, within 20 days of the Order
granting leave to withdraw. Id. Furthermore, Izopoli indicated that it was not actively pursuing
new counsel at that time. Id. Izopoli has not contested that it was aware of the withdrawal prior
to entry of the Default Judgment. Id. Tr., Vol. I, p. 19, L. 17-19. Izopoli failed to appear within
the time required by I.R.C.P. Rule l l(b)(3). The Order for Entry of Default Judgment was signed
on April 6, 2011 and filed on April 11, 2011. R. Vol. I, p. 105-07.
Izopoli filed its Motion to set Aside Default and Default Judgment, which was heard and
denied. R. Vol. I, p. 108-35.
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II.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

a. The Trial Court properly denied the Motion to Set Aside because the default judgment
was not void as a matter of law.
b. The Trial Court properly exercised its discretion.
c. The Trial Court properly denied the Motion to Set Aside because there was no excusable
neglect
d. McDavid is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.

IIL

ARGUMENT

a. The Trial Court Properly Denied The Motion To Set Aside Because The Default
.Judgment Was Not Void As A Matter Of Law.
The trial court properly determined that Izopoli was aware of its attorney's withdraw and
had ample time to obtain new counsel. The court then held that the service of the order of
withdrawal complied with I.R.C.P. Rule 1 l(b)(3). Tr .. Vol. I, p 28, L. 24-p. 29, L 1. The court
stated "The pennissive term "may" is used in the rule and I'm going to deny the motion to set
aside the defaults." Id. The Court addressed it again stating " ... the rule itself uses the term
"may" make service, and so just relying on the express terms of the rule, I don't think there is a
basis to set this aside." Tr., Vol. I, p 29, L. 11-14. Izopoli improperly argues that the trial court
failed to address the merits of this claim. Appellants' Brief, p.3 L 13-14.

b. The Trial Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion.
Izopoli's Second Argument is, to the extent that she did decide the issue, the trial court
did not have discretion in denying the Izopoli 's Motion to Set Aside because the default
judgment was void under I.R.C.P. Rule 60(b)(4). Izopoli's argument is that the judgment was
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void because the withdrawing counsel failed to strictly comply with Rule l l(b)(3). It is
uncontested that Izopoli received notice of the withdrawal of its attorney. Tr., Vol. I, p 19, L. 17I 8. The trial court held that "The critical part of the rule and the important notice ... was

provided." Tr., Vol. I, p 29, L. 7-8.
The "strict compliance" rule pertains to the language of the order inforn1ing the
Defendants of the ramifications of failing to act. The trial court's order adheres to those
requirements. Tr., Vol. I, p 28, L. 3 - p. 29, L.14. When discussing service of process, the
language of the Rule uses "may" and not "shall" or "must." Izopoli 's argument that service
"must" be made by certified mail is simply not present in the rule.
In its entirety, Idaho Rule of Ci vi I Procedure 1 1(b )(3) states:
If an attorney is granted leave to withdraw, the court shall enter an order
permitting the attorney to withdraw and directing the attorney's client to appoint
another attorney to appear, or to appear in person by filing a written notice with
the court stating how the client will proceed without an attorney, within 20 days
from the date of service or mailing of the order to the client. After an order is
entered, the withdrawing attorney shall forthwith, with due diligence, serve copies
of the same upon the client and all other parties to the action and shall file proof
of service with the court. The withdrawing attorney may make such service upon
the client by personal service or by certified mail to the last known address most
likely to give notice to the client, which service shall be complete upon mailing ...
(Emphasis added)

Idaho courts have held that actual notice is sufficient to overcome defects. The appellate
court in a forfeiture case held the district court complied with statutory requirements when there
was a defect in the notice and the defendant had actual notice of forfeiture. State of Idaho v.
Vargas, 141ldaho485, 486, 111 P.3d 621, 622 (2005). This Court held that notice is sufficient
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regardless of defects where there is evidence of ''actual" notice. In Vargas, the clerk sent a notice
of forfeiture, but listed the wrong forfeiture date. The bonding company argued that this error
rendered the notice invalid, but the court held that despite the error, the notice was sufficient to
notify the bonding company that forfeiture had occurred. Id. at 487, I I I P.3d at 623. The court
concluded the bonding company had "actual" notice of the forfeiture (as evidenced by the fact it
filed a motion for extension) and that the district court substantially complied with the statutory
requirements. Id. Sec also State v. Castro, I 45 Idaho 993, 996-997, I 88 P.3d 935, 938 939 (Id.
Ct. App. 2008).
Other states have made similar rulings. The California Appellate court held that actual
notice and substantial compliance with the code of civil procedure was sufficient. Gilbert, Inc. v.
Haller, I 79 Cal. App. 4th 852, I 0 I Cal. Rptr.3d 843 (Cal. App. 6 Dist. 2009). The court imposed

a three-prong test to determine whether substantial compliance was enough. The first element
was whether there was some degree of compliance. In the present case, the notice of withdrawal
contained all of the statutorily required language and was served upon lzopoli, albeit not via
certified mail. The second element is that the service must have made it highly probable that it
would impart the same notice as full compliance. In the present case, the attorney's mailing of
the notice to lzopoli and sending the notice via e-mail to the lzopoli's local council affected
actual service. As Izopoli is claimmg that Appellant Kiroglu was not in town when the notice
was sent, he would never have received the certified letter had counsel sent it. The final element
is that the service must have imparted notice. This element is uncontested. Tr., Vol. I, p 19, L. 1719. Izopoli was aware of the requirements imposed on it because it had received the Motion for

Respondent's Brief

5

Entry of Default and Default Judgment. Tr., Vol. I, p 23, L 5-19. Four days after the Motion for
Default was mailed, Izopoli contacted McDavid's attorney. Id. Izopoli admitted to actual notice
of the order to withdraw and that it was aware of the requirement to appear. Id. Furthermore, the
trial court held that its Order provided Izopoli with sufficient notice that it must act within 20
days in order to avoid default judgment. Tr., Vol. I, p 26, L. 2-9.
Izopoli improperly relies on case law in which default orders have been set aside.
Particularly, it relies on Fisher Systems Leasing, Inc. v. J & J Gunsmithing & Weaponry Design,
135 Idaho 624, 21 P .3d 946 (Id. Ct. App. 2001 ), as controlling and claim that since the attorney
for Izopoli did not send the Order for Withdrawal via certified mail or personal service the
Default Order is void. In Fisher, the withdrawal order itself was deficient.
The district court's withdrawal order did not set forth that default and default
judgment could be taken against Davis "without further notice" or that any
counterclaim could be dismissed "with prejudice" as is explicitly required by Rule
1 l(b)(3). And while the order recites that there is attached to it a copy of Rule
11 (b )(3 ), the actual order of withdrawal in the record before this Court does not
have a copy of the rule attached. Furthermore, Van Idour did not serve a copy of
the order on Davis through either personal service or certified mail and did not
file proof of such service with the district court, all of which are also specifically
required by Rule l l(b )(3) . A copy of this withdrawal order was sent to Davis'
address in Colorado, not by defense counsel as required by Rule 1 l(b)(3), but by
the clerk of the court. Id. at 626, P.3d at 948.
Similar to Fisher is Martinez v. Brown, 144 Idaho 410, 162 P .3d 7 89 (Id. Ct. App. 2007).
In this case, the district court's order of withdrawal failed to notify Martinez that his claim could
be dismissed "with prejudice" should he fail to appoint a new attorney to appear, or to appear on
his own behalf, within the designated time period. This too, pertains to the language of the Order
and not the method in which the Order was served.
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In McClure Engineering, Inc., v. Channel 5 KIDA, 143 Idaho 950, 155 P.3d 1189 (Id. Ct.
App. 2006), the Court distinguished itself from Fisher and upheld a court's denial of a motion to
vacate a default judgment even when the clients did not receive actual notice of the order of
withdrawal. The court stressed the obligation to send to the address most likely to give the
parties notice. In the present case, the order was sent to the address most likely to reach Izopoli
and Izopoli did indeed receive the notice. R. Vol. I, p. 112.
LR.C.P. Rule 61 instructs that the court, at every stage of a proceeding, "must disregard
any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties."
Here, Izopoli is claiming that even though it received notice - because the notice was not
personally served or sent via certified mail - its motion to vacate the default judgment should be
granted. Izopoli has failed to cite any case law in Idaho where the Defendant has admitted
receiving actual notice of withdrawal prior to the entry of the default and in which a motion to
set aside default is upheld.

c. The Trial Court Properly Denied The Motion To Set Aside Because There Was No
Excusable Neglect.
After weighing the evidence, the trial court determined that there was not excusable
neglect. Tr., Vol. I, p 29, L. 1-6. Rule 60(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a
judgment may be set aside on the grounds of mistake or excusable neglect. See LR.C.P. 60(b )(1)
and also LR.C.P. 55(c).
A mistake sufficient to warrant setting aside a default judgment must be of fact and not of
law. Neglect must be excusable, and to be of that calibre, must be conduct that might be expected

Respondent's Brief

7

of a reasonably prudent person under the same circumstances. Hearst Corp. v. Keller, 100 Idaho
10, 11, 592 P.2d 66, 67 (1979), See standard of review analysis in Shelton v. Diamond Intern.

Corp., 108 Idaho 935, 703 P.2d 699 (l 985).
Izopoli docs not deny that it received notice of withdrawal of its attorney, Mr. Knox. Tr.,

Vol. I, p 19, L. 17-19. Izopoli therefore had every oppo1tunity to retain new counsel, appear in
person, or otherwise comply with the Order of Withdrawal; but, it merely chose not to.
Receiving an order granting withdrawal and doing nothing about it is not a meritorious defense.
Izopoli had an obligation to comply with the order and failed to do so.
In determining whether Izopoli acted with excusable neglect, i.e. acting in such a way
that a reasonable person might have done the same thing under the circumstances; mere
indifference or inattention does not amount to excusable neglect. Thomas v. Stevens, 78 Idaho
266, 271, 300 P.2d 811, 813 (1956); LeaseFirst v. Burns, 131Idaho158, 162, 953 P.2d 598, 602
(1998). In this case, Izopoli failed to act within the timeframe prescribed by Rule l l(b)(3).
Izopoli failed to take action in late December when its counsel of record filed the Motion to
Withdraw. In fact, almost seven months separate the initial Motion to Withdraw and the
appearance of anyone for Izopoli. The reasonable and prudent person would have obtained
counsel shortly after being told that his counsel of record was withdrawing OR notified the court
that he would continue the matter Pro Se. Izopoli was, at best, indifferent or inattentive, and thus,
it failed to act as a reasonable person or corporation should. Additionally, "The party claiming
excusable neglect must have exercised due diligence in the prosecution of his rights and must not
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have exhibited indifference or unreasonable delay." Olson v. Kirkham, 111 Idaho 34, 38, 720
P .2d 217, 221 (Id. Ct. App. 1986).
Being on vacation is not a meritorious defense. Izopoli was notified of its attorney's
withdrawal and the court's order that within 20 days from the date of service or mailing it was
ordered to appoint another attorney or appear by filing a written notice stating how it would
proceed without an attorney. Likewise, any claim of lack notice of the default proceedings is also
not a meritorious defense. Again, the lack of notice is not claimed by Izopoli in this case. Tr.,
Vol.l,pl9,L.17-19.
The trial Court's Order clearly states:
... if Defendant fails to file and serve an additional written appearance, in person
or through a newly appointed attorney, within such 20-day period, such failure
shall be sufficient grounds for entry of default and default judgment against the
Defendant, without further notice to the Defendant. R. Vol. I, p. 93. (Emphasis
added).

Izopoli did not act reasonably and its inattention resulted in the Entry of Default. Izopoli
failed to act on its attorney's Motion to Withdraw in December of 2010. Again, it failed to act
between March 1, 2011 when it first learned of the Motion for Entry of Default and April 11,
2011 when the Order for Entry of Default was filed. Accordingly, it is not entitled to relief from
the default judgment under Rule 60(b )(4).

d. Respondent McDavid is Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal.

Attorney's fees on appeal are allowed pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules Ru!. 41. Izopoli
alleges that McDavid's defense of the Motion and the Subsequent defense of this appeal is
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frivolous unreasonable and without foundation. However, these arguments hold no merit because
the notice in question complied with LR.C.P. Rule l l(b)(3) as evidenced by McDavid's case
being upheld by the trial court. Along those same lines, McDavid believes that Izopoli's appeal
is frivolous, unreasonable and without foundation and filed solely to increase litigation expenses
and delay the final outcome of the case, and therefor requests attorneys fees and costs.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The Order for Entry of Default Judgment resulted from the inattention and indifference of
the Appellants. Izopoli did not act reasonably and diligently in the prosecution of its respective
rights. All of the necessary requirements for a default judgment have been complied with. This
Court should uphold the trial court's denial of the Motion to Set Aside and award McDavid her
attorney fees and costs on appeal.

DATED this 31st day of October 2012
LERMA LAW OFFICE, P.A.

Kenley E. Grover
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 31st day of October 2012, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document to be served by U.S. Mail upon the following person(s):

Murat Kiroglu
Mega Group International, LLC
Izopoli Group, LLC
Florida Floors and Decor, Inc.
3895 Pembroke Rd.
Hollywood, FL 33021

x

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Express Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile Transmission
Federal Express

Kenley E. Grover
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